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DEFAMATORY OPINIONS AND THE 
RESTATEMENT (Second) OF TORTS 
George C. Christie* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
After years of effort that included presentations at the annual 
meetings of the American Law Institute.in 1965, 1966, 1974, and 
1975, the Institute has finally published the portions of the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts that deal with defamation. The process was 
difficult and at times controversial. When the first two volumes of 
the Restatement (Second) were published in 1964, few people 
imagined that volume ill, which includes the Restatement's treat-
ment of defamation, would not appear until 1977. 
In the early stages there was a major controversy over whether 
a plaintiff, in an action for libel that did not involve one of the four 
categories that are grouped together under the rubric "slander per 
se," had to plead and prove special damages, as is required in all 
cases of slander not constituting slander per se. The original 
Restatement adopted the position of English law and imposed no 
such requirements upon the plaintiff.1 The then-reporter of the 
Restatement (Second), the late Dean Prosser, argued that the 
majority of the states did not accept this position. 2 Dean Prosser's 
interpretation of the cases was challenged by Lawrence H. Eldredge, 
who in 1966 was still active at the Philadelphia bar.3 At its 1965 
and 1966 annual meetings the Institute was unable to resolve these 
conflicting views, and the protagonists of each position continued the 
debate in the law reviews. 4 The controversy was resolved only after 
the New York Court of Appeals, in Hinsdale v. Orange County Pub-
* Professor of Law, Duke University. A.B. 19S5, J.D. 19S7, Columbia Univer-
sity; Dipl. Intl. Law 1962, Cambridge; S.J.D. 11966, Harvard University.-Ed. 
1. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS§ S69 (1938). 
2. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § S69, Note to Institute at 86-89 (Tent. 
Draft No. 11, 196S). 
3. See Mr. Eldredge's comments in 42 ALI PROCEEDINGS 411-16 (196S), 43 ALI 
PROCEEDINGS 434-39, 444-45 (1966). 
4. See Eldredge, Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 19 HARV. L. RBv. 733 (1966); 
Eldredge, Variation on Libel Per Quod, 2S VAND. L. RBv. 79 (1972); Prosser, More 
Libel Per Quod, 19 HARv. L. RBv. 1629 (1966). 
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lications, Inc., 5 came down firmly in favor of the position adopted 
in the original Restatement and espoused by Mr. Eldredge. Most 
other state courts in which the issue was litigated adopted the New 
York view, 6 and that ended the matter. 
While this debate was raging, the Institute and its reporter were 
forced to deal with the revolutionary developments in the law of def-
amation that were introduced by the Supreme Court, a process that 
began in March 1964 with the landmark decision in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan.1 Although the subject of defamation was not 
brought to the floor of the Institute until May 1965, much of the 
work on the defamation provisions of the then-proposed Restatement 
(Second)-which, except for the controversy over the need to plead 
and prove special damages in actions for libel, closely paralleled the 
original Restatement-had begun before 1964. The subsequent 
drafts and redrafts of these provisions represented an attempt by the 
Institute to accommodate the Restatement (Second) to the actions 
of the Supreme Court. Throughout that process the Institute re-
acted passively to the Court's decisions. It rarely attempted to an-
ticipate what the Court might do8 and was never cited by the Court 
as an authority on how the law in the area should develop. 9 The 
lnstitute's role in the whole process was, at best, reportorial. Seldom 
constructive in its approach, the Institute appeared at times to be 
conducting a rearguard action against the Court. 
This Article will focus on one important aspect of the Institute's 
work; the question of whether opinion, including ridicule, can be an 
independent basis of an action for defamation. Before undertaking 
5. 17 N.Y.2d 284, 217 N.E.2d 650, 270 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1966). As a consequence 
of the Hinsdale decision, Dean Prosser abandoned the struggle to change Restatement 
§ 569. Except for minor wording changes, that provision in the Restatement 
(Second) is identical to the original version. 
6. These state cases are listed in R!!srATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569, Re-
porter's Note at 59 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan the Court held that, at least with respect 
to the nonprivate aspects of his life, a public official could not successfully bring 
a defamation action unless he could show deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard 
of the truth on the part of the commentator. 
8. Not surprisingly, the Institute's own evaluation of its approach is more favor-
able. See III RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note at 151-52 (1977). 
9. In his dissent in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 374-76 (1974), 
Justice White suggested that the majority's concerns about the first amendment could 
be accommodated by adopting the libel per se/libel per quod distinction, the posi-
tion the Restatement (Second) had already abandoned by the time Justice White 
embraced it. Compare R!!srATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 569, at 29 (Tent. Draft 
No. 12 1966), which was cited by Justice White, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS§ 569, at 55 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
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that inquiry, however, some basic concepts regarding defamatory 
opinions must be understood. First, a statement of opinion can, of 
course, often be reasonably construed to imply the existence of facts 
that would justify the opinion. If a direct statement of those facts 
would be defamatory, then the statement of an opinion that implies 
the existence of those false facts would be defamatory and capable 
of supporting an action for defamation. An opinion is said to be 
an "independent" basis for an action for defamation only in a situa-
tion where either the facts are all known or no one would seriously 
consider the opinion in question as implying any particular factual 
allegations. Much ridicule is of this latter nature, as is, of course, 
much simple vituperation. Finally, a declaration need not be 
prefaced with the words "in my opinion" in order to be classified 
as a statement of opinion. Evaluative statements like "he is a fool, 
. . . a son of a bitch . . . a traitor to his class" are all statements 
of opinion. Some of these remarks may imply that the speaker is 
aware of specific facts that justify his choice of words, but others 
have only a vague connection with any particular factual context, and, 
as is the case with the most vituperative of these remarks, some have 
no such connection at all. 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts, as first proposed, strength-
ened the original provisions on defamatory opinion by expressly 
providing, in a new section, that ridicule could also be the basis of 
an action for defamation quite apart from any factual connotations 
of the challenged statements.10 Over the years the Institute stead-
fastly resisted attempts to retreat from this position. Indeed, it re-
affirmed that viewpoint as late as May 197 4, when it overwhelmingly 
rejected a motion to delete the provisions on defamation by opinion 
and ridicule.11 Then, on June 25, 1974, the Court handed down 
its decision in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,12 in which, speaking 
through Justice Powell, it declared that "[u]nder the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an 
opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the con-
science of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."13 
In a companion case decided the same day, Old Dominion Branch 
10. See, e.g., RBsTATBMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 567A, at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 
20, 1974). The provision also appeared in RBsTATBMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS 
§ 567A, at 79 (Tent. Draft N6. 11, 1965). 
11. 51 ALI PROCBEDINGS 339 (1974). 
12. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
13. 418 U.S. at 339-40. 
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No. 496, National, Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 14 the 
Court cited the Gertz declaration in denying relief to the plaintiffs 
by alternatively holding that most of the allegedly libelous statements 
in Old Dominion were mere epithets that could not support an action 
for defamation.15 
Many people would have thought that Gertz would end the 
matter. Surprisingly, however, the draftsmen of the Restatement 
(Second) showed themselves unable to bury the question com-
pletely, and, despite the language of Gertz, it was proposed at the 
197 5 annual meeting that the Institute handle the entire subject of 
defamatory opinions by adopting the following revision of section 
566: 
Expression of Opinion. 
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the 
form of an opinion. A statement of this nature, at least if it is on 
a matter of public concern, is actionable, however, only if it also ex-
presses, or implies the assertion of, a false and defamatory fact which 
is not known or assumed by both parties to the communication.10 
On its face this provision left open the possibility that opinion qua 
opinion could be actionable in certain circumstances. As will be dis-
cussed in some detail later in this Article, 17 the "loophole" suggested 
by the italicized language was narrowed considerably by the com-
ments accompanying proposed section 566 and, later in the process 
of securing the approval of the Institute, closed entirely by the dele-
tion of the italicized words from the provision. 18 This was not the 
only accommodation that the Institute was forced to make, for, at 
14. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). 
15. In a recent article, Professor Alfred Hill, after characterizing the Gertz dec-
laration as "dictum" on a problem "not remotely in issue in Gertz," states: "Yet 
it is apparently solely in consequence of the Gertz dictum that the Restatement 
(Second) now provides that an action can never lie for an opinion qua opinion." Hill, 
Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 16 CoLUM. L. REV, 1205, 
1239-40 (1976). In an accompanying footnote, id. at 1239 n.156, Professor Hill 
treats the Old Dominion case as a federal labor law case. Leaving aside the question 
whether or not Old Dominion was or was not in the minds of the Restatement's 
draftsmen, whether Old Dominion can be dismissed as a federal labor case is a point 
on which conflicting views may be expressed. See, e.g., Christie, Injuries to Reputa-
tion and the Constitution: Confusion Amid Conflicting Approaches, 15 MICH. L. 
REv. 43, 51-52 (1976). See id. for a brief review of the Supreme Court's efforts 
in the field of defamation since the decision of &ullivan in 1964. 
16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). 
The material in italics was inserted by the Council of the Institute. See note 37 
infra. 
17. See text at note 38 infra. 
18. See text at note 39 infra. 
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the same time that the wording of section 566 was finally being 
brought in line with the Gertz declaration, the Institute also 
eliminated proposed sections 606-610, which dealt with fair com-
ment.19 The need for doing so was inescapable. If only false state-
ments of fact could be actionable, it was irrelevant whether the com-
ment was fair or not. Comment qua comment could never be 
actionable. 20 
Certainly many people would find the Restatement's final 
manuevering an odd and somewhat grudging accommodation to 
Gertz and its companion case, Old Dominion. More fascinating, 
however, is the validity of, first, the theory behind the Restatement's 
approach over the past forty years to the questions of defamation 
and of defamatory opinions and, second, the methodology employed 
in the production of the Restatement (Second). These matters will 
be the primary focus of this Article. 
TI. THE "Lome'' UNDERLYING THE Restatements 
.APPROACH TO DEFAMATION 
A. The Original Restatement 
Volume ill of the Restatement, which contains the provisions on 
defamation, was published in 1938. As already indicated, it took 
the position that the expression of an opinion on the basis of known 
facts could be the subject of an action for defamation. 21 The diffi-
culty, however, was that the Restatement had already committed it-
self to a basic view of the nature of defamation that made it logically 
impossible for it to adopt this position even if the support for this 
approach in the cases was completely overwhelming, which it 
certainly was not. 22 This internal inconsistency has plagued the 
Restatement ever since and was even exacerbated in the early drafts 
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, Note to Institute at 13 (Tent. 
Draft No. 21, 1975). 
20. Professor Hill decries the Restatement's deletion of the "fair comment" provi-
sions. Hill, supra note 15, at 1239-45. In an argument that I find hard to follow 
or to accept, he speculates, as I understand him, that in striving to give some redress 
for the expression of scurrilous opinion, the Court is likely to hold that the opinion 
really amounts to a false assertion of fact, a finding from which liability will auto-
matically follow. If the problem were approached under the common law privilege 
or concept of fair comment, which has underlying it an elaborate case law on what 
constitutes an abuse of the privilege, liability is less likely to result. He thus feels 
that deleting any mention of the fair comment defense might reduce a speaker's 
first amendment protections. 
21. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 566 (1938). 
22. For a discussion of the paucity of authority cited for this position by the 
draftsmen of the Restatement (Second), see text at note 74 infra. 
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of the Restatement (Second). The nature ~f the logical problems 
is readily evident on the face of the Restatement. In section 558, 
its first provision on the subject, the Restatement set forth the under-
lying nature of liability for defamation: 
§ 558. Elements Stated. 
To create liability for defamation there must be an unprivileged 
publication of false and defamatory matter of another which 
(a) is actionable irrespective of special harm, or 
(b) if not so actionable, is the legal cause of special harm to the 
other.28 
Succeeding sections of the Restatement elaborated upon these 
general principles. Section 565, for example, contained the unex-
ceptionable statement that "a defamatory communication may con-
sist of a statement of fact," and section 567 likewise provided that 
· "a defamatory communication may consist of a statement of opinion 
upon undisclosed facts." In the intervening section 566, however, 
the Restatement fell into the error from which, for a long time, it 
was not able fully to extricate itself. That provision and its accom-
panying comment and illustration are, accordingly, best set out in 
toto: 
§566. Expressions of Opinion Upon Known or Assumed Facts. 
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement of 
opinion based upon facts known or assumed by both parties to the 
communication. 
Comment: 
a. Under the rule stated in this Section, the defamation may 
consist of a comment upon some act or omission of another which 
is accurately stated by the person making the comment or which, be-
cause of its notoriety or otherwise, is known to the recipient. If such 
comment expresses a sufficiently derogatory opinion as to the conduct 
in question, it is defamatory and, unless it is privileged as fair com-
ment (see § 606), is actionable. On the other hand, the comment 
may be upon conduct which is stated by the person making the com-
ment and which is otherwise unknown to its recipient. If the other's 
conduct is inaccurately or falsely described, the statement thereof is 
defamatory under the rule stated in § 565. The alleged conduct on 
which the comment is based may, however, be itself not so reprehen-
sible as to make its imputation defamatory under § 565, but nonethe-
23. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 558 (1938). 
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less the comment thereon may be so derogatory as to make it 
defamatory under the rule stated in this Section. 
The truth or falsity of an accusation of reprehensible conduct is 
a matter of fact, provable as such. The propriety of the opinion, as 
fair comment thereon, is a matter of judgment. Nevertheless, a de-
famatory communication may be made by derogatory adjectives or 
epithets as well as by statements of fact. Thus, it is defamatory to 
add to an accurate statement of another's innocent conduct, an adjec-
tive or epithet which characterizes it as reprehensible. 
Illustration: 
I. A, while making a political speech, accurately relates certain 
specific conduct of his opponent in blocking reform measures advo-
cated by A. In the course of his argument, A declares that any per-
son who would so conduct himself is no better than a murderer. A 
has defamed his opponent under the rule stated in this Section. 
Whether the defamation is privileged as fair coment is determined 
by the rule stated in § 606. 24 
Leaving aside the constitutional questions that would now be 
presented, it is clear that this provision is flatly inconsistent with sec-
tion 558, which categorically states that "to create liability for 
defamation" there must be publication of matter which is "false and 
defamatory." By no stretch of the imagination can section 566, 
particularly as fleshed out by the comments and the illustration, be 
said to apply to things capable of being labeled false. Indeed, the 
illustration is precisely a case where the statement in question is not 
logically capable of being true or false, and hence, under section 
558, it is not within the range of speech to which the concept of 
defamation is applicable. Insofar as it allowed for the possibility of 
liability merely for the expression of an opinion, section 606 of the 
Restatement, which dealt with what is customarily called the defense 
or privilege of "fair comment," was also subject to the same logical 
criticism. 211 
It is interesting to note that Professor Arthur Goodhart, in a 
1941 article comparing American law (as evidenced in volume ill 
of the Restatement of Torts) to English law, made this comment 
about section 566: 
24. Id. § 566. 
25. In the illustration to Restatement § 566 set out in the text at note 24 supra, 
§ 606 on fair comment (or "privileged criticism") was envisaged as a defense avail-
able, in some situations, to one who would otherwise be subject to liability under 
§ 566 for publishing a defamatory opinion. But, even in situations in which it was 
available, the privilege could be defeated, inter alia, if malice were shown or, in 
some circumstances, if the comment were unfair. 
1628 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 75: 1621 
Illustration ( 1) to Section 566 is rather a strange one. It holds 
that to state of a political opponent who has blocked reform measures 
that he "is no better than a murderer" is defamatory. It is probable 
that the English courts would hold that this was merely a form of 
abuse, and therefore not actionable. American political controversies 
must be conducted on a very high level if such a remark is held to 
fall within the law of defamation. 26 
The extent to which statements not capable of being either true or 
false have been held to be actionable is a question addressed in sec-
tion ill of this Article, where the methodology employed in the 
preparation of the Restatement (Secona)'s treatment of defamatory 
opinions will be examined. For the moment it is necessary to turn 
to the Restatement (Second) in order to continue our exploration 
of the Restatement's internal inconsistencies. 
B. The Restatement (Second) 
Instead of eliminating the inconsistencies present in the original 
Restatement, the Restatement (Secona), as first drafted, exacer-
bated them. Restatement sections 558, 565, and 567 were retained 
substantially verbatim, 27 as was section 566, which thus continued 
to be the odd man out. The only alterations in these provisions worth 
mention were some additions to the comments and some changes 
in the illustrations to reflect the fact that in 1964, with its decision 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,28 the Court had begun to impose 
constituti,onal limitations upon the law of defamation. The alterations 
in the comment to section 566, which did not appear until the 1974 
draft, were as follows: 
Even though an expression of a derogatory opinion is defamatory, 
the Constitution may restrict the maintaining of an action for defama-
tion if it deals with a matter of public or general interest. (See § 
581, Comment i). It may also be privileged as fair comment. (See 
§ 606). 
Illustration: 
1. A, while discussing his next-door neighbor with a friend, ac-
26. Goodhart, Restatement of the Law of Torts, Volume Ill: A Comparison Be-
tween American and English Law, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 265, 283-84 (1941). 
27. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966) (no mention of a section 
in the tentative draft means the original Restatement section was to be retained). 
See also the comment by Mr. Lawrence Eldredge in 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 333-34 
(1974). 
28. 376 U.S. 254 (1964), discussed in note 7 supra. 
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curately relates certain specific conduct of his neighbor in abusing his 
wife. In the course of his discussion, A declares that any person who 
would so conduct himself is no better than a murderer. A has de-
famed his [neighbor] under the rule stated in this Section.29 
But at the same time the Institute in the Restatement (Second) was 
acknowledging the constitutional boundaries of liability for defama-
tion, it continued to propose that a new section, 567 A, be adopted, 
the practical effect of which was to broaden the range of such liability. 
Section 567A and its accompanying comment provided as follows: 
§ 567A. Ridicule. 
A defamatory communication may consist of words or other 
matter which ridicule another. 
Comment: 
a. Ridicule. One common form of defamation is ridicule, which 
in effect is the expression of an opinion that the plaintiff is ridiculous, 
and so exposes him to contempt or derision, or other derogatory feel-
ings. Humorous writings, verses, cartoons or caricatures which carry 
a sting and cause adverse rather than sympathetic or neutral merri-
ment, may be defamatory. It is of course possible that any 
humorous publication may reasonably be understood only as good-
natured fun, not to be taken seriously, and in no way intended to 
reflect upon the individual. Thus a narration by a toastmaster at a 
banquet of some entirely fictitious and utterly ridiculous incident in-
volving the speaker whom he is introducing is not reasonably to be 
understood as defamation, but only as a jest. But if the same narra-
tive is reported in a newspaper, where it is read by those who were 
not present and did not understand the situation, it may become de-
famatory. 
NOTE: This section has been added to the first Restatement.30 
Of the portions of the Restatement (Second) now under discussion, 
only the newly proposed section 567 A on ridicule was brought 
before the Institute in 1965, the year in which the Institute first ad-
dressed itself to the subject of defamation, and, at that time, it re-
ceived very little attention. All of these provisions were presented 
to the Institute in 197 4, 31 in conjunction with a review of the 
29. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, Comment a & Illustration 1 (Tent. 
Draft No. 20, 1974). 
30. Id. § 561A. 
31. At the 1974 meeting of the ALI, the reporter asserted that § 567A had 
been approved by the Institute "in the 1960's." 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 307 (1974). 
This does not appear to be the case, as that provision was not put to a vote, and 
Dean Prosser indicated he might remove the section. 42 ALI PROCEEDINGS 404-
05 (1965). 
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Restatement (Second)'s treatment of the entire subject of defama-
tion in the light of developments in the Supreme Court. 32 As al-
ready noted, an attempt was then made to strike sections 566 and 
567A on both logical and constitutional grounds.33 The attempt was 
decisively defeated. 3• 
Within five weeks, however, the Court handed down Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc.35 and Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National 
Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin.36 The Institute, unpre-
pared as it was to recognize the demands of pure logic, could no 
longer shut its eyes to the direction in which the Court was moving. 
One might have hoped that the Institute would have abandoned all 
attempts to deal with defamatory opinions and been content with sec-
tion 558's declaration that an action for defamation required publica-
tion of matter that was false as well as defamatory. That expressions 
of opinion, insofar as they implied the existence of defamatory facts, 
could lead to liability for defamation could then have been covered 
in the comments. Instead, the Council of the Institute proposed a re-
vised Restatement section 566, which, as we have seen, provided: 
§ 566. Expression of Opinion. 
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the 
form of an opinion. A statement of this nature, at least if it is on 
a matter of public concern, is actionable, however, only if it also ex-
presses, or implies the assertion of, a false and defamatory fact which 
is not known or assumed by both parties to the communication.37 
On its face this section-which covered the matters originally in-
cluded in section 566 and the now-deleted sections 567 and 567A 
of the proposed Restatement (Second)-left open the possibility 
that mere expressions of opinion on matters not of "public concern" 
could be actionable even if they did not express or imply the asser-
tion of "a false and defamatory fact which is not known or assumed 
by both parties to the communication." The accompanying com-
32. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Special Note at 2 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 
1974). 
33. 51 ALI PROCEEDINGS 306-08, 332-37 (1974). 
34. Id. at 339. 
35. 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed in text at notes 12-13 supra. 
36. 418 U.S. 264 (1974), discussed in text at notes 14-15 supra. 
37. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, at 6 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). 
At the 1975 meeting of the American Law Institute, the reporter stated that he 
drafted the provision without the words "at least if it is on a matter of public con-
cern," which were later inserted at the direction of the Council. 52 ALI PROCEED· 
INGS 152 (1975). ' 
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ment, however, made it clear that even the Institute recognized that 
the possibility of such liability ran squarely against the logic of Gertz: 
Comment: 
c. Effect of the Constitution. The common law rule that an ex-
pression of opinion of the first, or pure, type may be the basis of an 
action for defamation now appears to have been rendered unconstitu-
tional by U.S. Supreme Court decisions. As the Court says in Gertz 
v. Robert Welch, Inc., (1974) 418 U.S. 323, 339: "Under the First 
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. 
But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact." This 
categoric statement was not necessary to the decision in the case in 
which it is found, and the Supreme Court indications that an ex-
pression of opinion cannot be the basis of a defamation action have 
involved public communications on matters of public concern. While 
it is thus possible that private communications on private matters will 
be treated differently, the logic of the constitutional principle would 
appear to apply to all expressions of opinion of the first, or pure, type. 
The distinction between the two types of expression of opinion, 
as explained in Comment b, therefore becomes constitutionally sig-
nificant. The requirement that a plaintiff prove that the defendant 
published a defamatory statement of fact about him which was false 
(See § 558) can be complied with by proving the publication of an 
expression of opinion of the mixed type, if the comment reasonably 
implies the assertion of the existence of undisclosed facts about the 
plaintiff which must be defamatory in character in order to justify 
the opinion. A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or 
assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of 
defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion 
may be or how derogatory it is.38 
This interplay between section and comment was unquestionably 
a curious way to attempt to handle the matter. At its meeting in 
May 1975, the Institute voted to strike the language "at least if it 
[the opinion] is on a matter of public concern," and the conform-
ance to the Gertz declaration was finally made complete.39 The pro-
vision was subsequently reworded by the reporter and, as it has now 
been published in the Restatement (Second), reads: 
§ 566. Expressions of Opinion. 
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the 
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 566, at 8 (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975). 
39. 52 ALI PROCEEDINGS 155 (1975). 
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form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only 
if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis 
for the opinion.40 
In the redrafted comment to this section the Institute also belatedly 
recognized that, in originally allowing for defamation by opinion 
without reference to any false implication of facts, it had departed 
from the logic underlying the Restatement's treatment of defama-
tion. It explained away this contradiction in a section of the com-
ment introduced by the heading "Opinion as defamatory at common 
law." After stating that "[u]nder the law of defamation, an expres-
sion of opinion could be defamatory if the expression was sufficiently 
derogatory of another as to cause harm to his reputation," it 
obliquely recognized the internal contradiction of its earlier position 
by declaring that "[t]he expression of opinion was also actionable 
in a suit for defamation, despite the normal requirement that the 
communication be false as well as defamatory. (See § 558)."41 I 
leave to the reader whether the categorical statement of section 558, 
which in both the Restatement and the Restatement (Second) un-
equivocably declares that "[t]o create liability for defamation there 
must be . . . [a] false and defamatory statement concerning 
another," can fairly be described as merely stating the "normal'' rule. 
Ill. THE METHODOLOGY OF THE 
Restatement (Second) 
It is submitted that the Institute's treatment of the subject of 
defamatory opinions, which has produced a satisfactory solution to 
the problem only after a great deal of time and effort, is in large 
part the product of the methodology that the Institute applied to its 
tasks. In particular, the Institute's approach to the cases concerned 
with defamation left much to be desired. Nowhere is this better 
illustrated than in the development of the proposed section 567 A 
dealing with ridicule. The Restatement (Second), it will be re-
called, proposed a separate section specifically stating that "a de-
famatory communication may consist of words or other matter which 
ridicule another. "42 Of the ten cases cited in support of this proposi-
40. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 566 (1977). 
4'1. Id., Comment a at 171 (emphasis added). This statement first appeared in 
Tentative Draft No. 21 (1975). It was undoubtedly added to meet some of the ob-
jections raised during the unsuccessful efforts to delete § 567A and § 566, as they 
were then drafted, at the Institute's 1974 annual meeting. See text at note 33 supra. 
42. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567A, at 79 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 
1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 567A, at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
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tion, five were decided before 1915 and only two after 1936.43 
Four of these cases were from New York, with the most recent an 
appellate division decision in 1930.44 Regrettably, all four New York 
cases concerned the preliminary question of whether the plaintiff 
had sufficiently pleaded a cause of action; in none of them, therefore, 
did the court consider and weigh the possible defenses to such actions. 
The key New York decision was Triggs v. Sun Printing and 
Publishing Association, 45 decided by the court of appeals in 1904. 
On the basis of Triggs, a New York lower court held libelous an 
apparently true newspaper article about a woman upon whom 
process was served iri a bathtub by a man who slipped past the 
"Irish" maid by telling her "I'm sure she's very anxious to see me";46 
another New York lower court found libelous an article that reported 
that a Spanish nobleman was "in revolt against work" and had quit 
a job as a "carpet layer" in his father-in-law's hotel business. 47 In 
both cases the courts held the items were not "news" stories. In 
the third and most recent post-Triggs case in New York, Zbyszko 
v. New York American, Inc.,48 the appellate division held libelous 
a picture of a professional wrestler printed next to that of a gorilla 
used to illustrate an article about similarities between man and the 
gorilla and to support the contention that both have evolved from a 
common source. This article was unlike the other two since the use 
of Zbyszko's name and picture was not part of the reporting of an 
allegedly newsworthy event, although the other two cases could like-
wise be considered as invasions of privacy, given the relative obscu-
rity of the plaintiffs. Nevertheless, except possibly for Zbyszko, it 
is hard to imagine that a mo4em court would have allowed recovery 
in any of these cases. 
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 567 A, at 46 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 
1974). 
44. The New York cases cited are Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Assn., 
179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904); Zbyszko v. New York American, Inc., 228 App. 
Div. 277, 239 N.Y.S. 411 (1930); Snyder v. New York Press Co., 137 App. Div. 
291, 121 N.Y.S. 944 (1910); Pignatelli v. New York Tribune, Inc., 117 Misc. 466, 
192 N.Y.S. 605 (Sup. Ct. 1921). 
45. 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904). In Triggs, the court held that the plain-
tiff, a University of Chicago professor of English, had a cause of action for libel 
against a newspaper that had printed three articles that allegedly portrayed him as 
a "presumptuous literary freak." 179 N.Y. at 155, 71 N.E. at 742. 
46. Snyder v. New York Press Co., 137 App. Div. 291, 293, 121 N.Y.S. 944, 
945 (1910). 
47. Pignatelli v. New York Tribune, Inc., 117 Misc. 466, 467, 192 N.Y.S. 605, 
606 (Sup. Ct. 1921). 
48. 228 App. Div. 277, 239 N.Y.S. 411 (1930). 
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Two of the non-New York cases cited by the proposed Restate-
ment (Second) in support of its provision on ridicule involved 
serious factual charges: in one case, suggestions of marital infidel-
ity;49 in the other, intentionally serving unwholesome food to the 
city's poor in order to save money. 50 One supposes the cases were 
cited under the ridicule section because of the manner in which the 
charges were made. In the case involving the alleged marital im-
propriety, the article was couched in a humorous and titillating 
style, 51 and in the other case the medium was a cartoon containing 
items captioned as "rancid butter" and "poor food."52 
Of the other non-New York cases cited to support the contention 
that ridicule may be defamatory independently of the factual impli-
cations it contains, two are comparatively recent, though both are 
relatively obscure. One was an Oregon case decided in 1973.Ga In 
that case a book mentioned the plaintiff by name and described him 
as "close to being the laziest man in the world." As an illustration, 
the book stated that much of the plaintiff's house was built by his 
wife and that the plaintiff "was always falling asleep on the mower 
and would end up drowsing with his team standing quietly idle some-
where off in the jackpines, where the mower had finally run into 
a tree too big to cut."54 The Oregon court acknowledged that it 
had previously held that it was not defamatory to say falsely that a 
husband and wife were separated and getting a divorce. Gl'.i How 
could it then hold that it was defamatory to call a person lazy? The 
court found its solution in a distinction between the mere statement 
of a charge and the statement of a charge with such embellishments 
and illustrations as would subject the person to ridicule. 56 Principal 
reliance for the holding was placed on the treatment of ridicule in 
Dean Prosser's hornbook, which reflected the position he had taken 
in the drafting of the proposed Restatement 567 A. G7 Even though the 
decision seemed to permit liability to rest upon the apparently true 
49. Colbert v. Journal Publishing Co., 19 N.M. 156, 142 P. 146 (1914), 
50. Brown v. Harrington, 208 Mass. 600, 95 N.E. 655 (1911). 
51. 19 N.M. at 164-65, 142 P. at 148-49. 
52. 208 Mass. at 601, 95 N.E. at 655. 
53. Farnsworth v. Hyde, 266 Ore. 236, 512 P.2d 1003 (1973). 
54. 266 Ore. at 237-38, 512 P.2d at 1004 (quoting defendant's book). 
55. 266 Ore. at 239, 512 P.2d at 1004 (citing Andreason v. Guard Publishing Co., 
260 Ore. 308, 3111, 489 P.2d944, 945 (1971)). 
56. 266 Ore. at 239 n.2, 512 P.2d at 1004 n.2. 
51. See 266 Ore. at 239-40, 512 P.2d at 1004-05 (citing W. PROSSER, THE LAW 
OF TORTS 742-43 (4th ed. 197!1·) ). 
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statements that plaintiffs wife built their house and that the plaintiff 
fell asleep on his mower, there was no discussion of whether this con-
clusion could stand in the light of Time, Inc. v. Hill. 58 The second 
of this pair of cases was decided in 1958 and involved a newspaper 
article about a thirty-five-year-old man who was building his own 
coffin to save money.59 In upholding liability, the Maine court held 
that this article about a "classic example of Yankee thrift"60 made 
the plaintiff seem "odd."61 
The remaining two non-New York cases are somewhat more 
famous. In Buckstaff v. Viall,62 decided in 1893, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court held that a satirical "prayer to Bucksniff' that urged 
him to stop blocking approval by the state legislature of an amend-
ment to the charter of the city of Oshkosh defamed the plaintiff, a 
state senator to whom the prayer was obviously addressed. Even 
if the newspaper were wrong in supposing that Buckstaff was the 
cause of the legislative inaction, in light of New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan and its aftermath68 it really is inconceivable how lawyers in 
the United States, let alone those preparing material for the Ameri-
can Law Institute, could in 1974 have considered the Buckstaff case 
to be good law. 
The last non-New York state court case, Burton v. Crowell Pub-
lishing Co., 64 is also of little precedential value, being almost sui 
generis. The case, familiar to many law students, was decided by the 
Second Circuit in the pre-Erie days, and involved an endorsement for 
Camel cigarettes given by a famous gentleman jockey. In one part of 
the advertisement there was the caption, "Get a lift with a Camel."65 
The plaintiff was also quoted as being "restored" after a "crowded 
business day."66 The crucial part of the advertisement was a 
photograph of the plaintiff dressed as a jockey and holding a 
saddle, with the white girth thrown over it, about twelve inches 
below his waist. The picture, for some odd reason, made it look 
58. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). Surely the Oregon court was not suggesting that it is 
easier to bring an action for the publication of true statements than it is for the pub-
lication of false statements. See also Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 
(1975). 
59. Powers v. Durgin-Snow Publishing Co., 154 Me. 108, 144 A.2d 294 ( 1958). 
60. 154 Me. at 109, 144 A.2d at 295. 
61. 154 Me. at 111, 144 A.2d at 296. 
62. 84 Wis. 129, 54 N.W. 111 (1893). 
63. See note 7 supra; Christie, note 15 supra, at 46-47. 
64. 82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936). 
65. 82 F.2d at 154. 
66. 82 F.2d at 154. 
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very much as if the plaintiff were exposing himself in a bizarre and 
grotesque manner. The trial judge was not sympathetic, finding that 
no right-minded person would hold the plaintiff up to ridicule, hatred 
or contempt because of the photograph and that, in any event, the 
plaintiff had consented to its use. On appeal, the plaintiffs attorneys 
argued that grotesque phalli had been used on the stage in ancient 
Greece and that, given the suggestiveness of the photograph, people 
might be prepared to think that the plaintiff was engaging in similar 
conduct. 67 The court, through Judge Learned Hand, refused all 
suggestions that "the advertisement might be read to say that the 
plaintiff was deformed, or . . . had indecently exposed himself, or 
was making obscene jokes."68 Judge Hand ruled, however, that 
the advertisement was libelous, even though under his interpretation 
it was not capable of being true or false, because the advertisement 
held the plaintiff up to "ridicule" and "contempt."69 The case 
seems so unusual and, if the court were not so prudish, so capable 
of being fitted into the traditional true/false category, that it has 
little precedential value. Indeed, with the Buckstaff result now a 
constitutional impossibility, Triggs remains the only really major sup-
port for proposed section 567 A of the Restatement. It is therefore 
important to analyze the Triggs case carefully and to compare it with 
modem practice-after all, it was cited as good law as recently as 
1974. 
Triggs v. Sun Printing and Publishing Association70 involved a 
series of sarcastic articles about Professor Oscar L. Triggs, a well-
known professor of English at The University of Chicago who, among 
other things, favored a simpler style of English than was currently 
fashionable. Triggs had turned down a substantial offer to give pub-
lic lectures to the audiences who went to view the plays of a tour-
ing Shakespearean company. As part of its sarcastic series of 
articles about the professor, the newspaper described how it imag-
ined he would rewrite Shakespeare. In bringing the action, Triggs' 
counsel argued that the article implied that Triggs was an illiterate 
buffoon who was not professionally qualified to fill his high academic 
post and that such false factual implications made the articles 
libelous. The New York Court of Appeals, however, while holding 
that Triggs had stated a good cause of action for libel, focused only 
67. Recollection of Parker Bailey, Esq., a friend of the author and one of plain• 
tifrs counsel in the case. In addition, see Appellant's Brief at 11-12. 
68. 82 .F.2d at 155. 
69. 82 F.2d at 155-56. 
70. 179 N.Y. 144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904). 
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on the ridicule and seemingly held that it alone made out the libel 
in the circumstances of the case before it. In judging the merits 
of that holding, it might be instructive to set out the heart of the 
ridicule in Triggs71 and to contrast it with a New York Times article 
by Russell Baker that appeared on January 10, 1965. 
One of the articles involved in Triggs stated: 
"As yet, Prof. Triggs is but in the bud . . . . He ... came near 
blossoming the other day, and the English drama would have blos-
somed with him. A firm which is to produce 'Romeo and Juliet' of-
fered him $700 a week to be the 'advance agent' of the show and to 
'work up enthusiasm by lecturing.' Prof. Triggs . . . was compelled 
to decline th~ offer, but the terms of his refusal show that it is not 
absolute, and that 'some day' as the melodramas cry, he will illu-
minate Shakespeare, dramatic literature and the public mind: 'I regret 
my inability, at this time, to take advantage of this opportunity, for 
the plan proposed seems to me to be an excellent one. I would re-
gard it, from my point of view, as an educational opportunity. It 
would gratify me to be able to present my views on drama, on Shake-
speare and on this particular play to audiences that would gather to-
gether from a serious interest in the drama itself. This would be a 
form of. 'university extension' not hitherto tried, and which should be 
attended with good educational results-such as I would desire and 
such also as I assume you would desire.' The nap is worn off the 
phrase 'university extension.' What Prof. Triggs . . . proposes and 
the country hungers for is Triggs . . . 'extension.' He must not give 
up to Chicago what was meant for mankind. His views on any sub-
ject are impressive, but on Shakespeare they would be as authoritative 
and final as: it is his genius to be. As we have watched him 
. . . swatting Whittier and Longfellow, we have felt like yelling: 
'What are thou drawn among these heartless hinds?' . . . The pro-
71. The major thrust of the ridicule of Professor Triggs concerned the matters 
to be set out shortly in the text. Triggs was also ridiculed, however, for, inter 
alia, not being able to decide on a name for his child until the child was one year 
old. The story was apparently true. The New York Court of Appeals declared that 
the area of privileged criticism "does not follow a public man into his private· life 
[or allow the critic to] pry into his domestic concerns." 179 N.Y. at 156, 71 N.E. 
at 743. Recognizing that this doctrine may not have been properly applied in Triggs, 
Professor Hill believes the Restatement (Second)'s original position to have been 
sound. See Hill, supra note 15, at 1236. I am skeptical of the validity of this doc-
trine insofar as it permits punishing a speaker for speaking the truth on matters 
about which he has learned without physically intruding into the plaintiffs home, 
office, or other area of privacy, and with.out violating any confidential relationship. 
A possible exception is where the matter concerns some particularly intimate detail, 
such as the plaintiffs sex life. On the peripheral private matters involved in Triggs, 
Restatement § 606 on "privileged criticism" (or fair comment) permitted criticism 
of the private conduct or character of a public person, if the matter in issue affected 
"his public conduct." The supposedly private matter in Triggs arguably met this 
criterion. Moreover, even if the statement were false, which it apparently was not, 
is it defamatory to state falsely that a person took a year agonizing over a name for 
his child? . 
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fessor . . . should take a man more nearly of his size. The 
Shakespeare legend should be allowed to delude no more. Prof. 
Triggs . . . can be depended upon to reduce this man Shakespeare 
to his natural proportions, club the sawdust out of that wax figger of 
literature and preach to eager multitudes the superiority of the 
modem playrights, with all the modern improvements . . . . The so-
called poetry and imagination visible in this Stratford Charlatan's 
plays must be tom out, deracinated, the fellow . . . would call it, 
in his fustian style . . . . If these plays are to be put upon the stage, 
they must be rewritten; and Prof. Triggs . . . is the destined rewriter, 
amender and reviser. The sapless, old-fashioned rhetoric must be 
cut down. The fresh and natural contemporary tongue, pure 
Triggsian, must be substituted. For example, who can read with 
patience these tinsel lines? 'Madam, an hour before the worshipped 
sun peered forth the golden window of the east, a troubled mind 
drave me to walk abroad.' This must be translated into Triggsian 
... somewhat like this: 'Say, lady, an hour before sun-up I was 
feeling wormy and took a walk around the block' . • . . Here is 
more Shakespearian rubbish: 
'0, she doth teach the torches to burn bright! 
Her beauty hangs upon the cheek of night, 
As a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear.' 
How much more forcible in clear, concise Triggsian: 'Say, she's a 
peach! A bird!' . . . Hear 'Pop' Capulet drivel: 'Go to, go to, 
You are a saucy boy!' In the Oscar . . . dialect, this is this: 'Come 
off, kid. You're too fresh.' . . . Compare the dropsical hifalutin: 
'Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day 
Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain's tops,' 
with the time-saving Triggsian version: 'I hear the milkman.' 
The downfall of Shakespeare is only a matter of time and Triggs. 
"72 
Contrast the following excerpt from Russell Baker's compara-
tively recent article in the New York Times: 
Mortimer Adler, the Great Books man, confesses in Playboy, that 
some of the classics bore even him. If Dr. Adler can't stand Cicero, 
it seems reasonable to assume that we Playboy oriented masses find 
the going just as tough with the lighter authors, such as Thomas 
Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. 
The problem, for a nation self-consciously aware that it is sup-
posed to be undergoing a cultural explosion, is how to keep the clas-
sics alive. The solution would seem to lie in bringing them up to 
date, possibly by commissioning the foremost writers of the day to 
rework them in terms that are meaningful to culturally exploding 
moderns. 
To illustrate what can be done, here is a hypothetical publisher's 
72. 179 N.Y. at 148-50, 71 N.E. at 740-41 (quoting the allegedly libelous article), 
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list of a book house that might be called Modernized Library: 
Anna Karenina by Henry Miller. In his revivification of 
Tolstoy's lugubrious Tsarist soap opera, Miller, writing in the first 
person through Vronsky's eyes, shifts the scene from Russia to Paris 
of the 1930's to illuminate the mystical hedonism of a profligate 
young Count . fleeing American materialism. In his liaison with 
Anna, the half-wit wife of a French telegraph deliveryman, Vronsky 
perceives that the essential evil of woman is her destructive hatred 
of man's polygamous nature. With characteristic exhaustiveness, 
Miller finally answers all questions about the physical relationship be-
tween Anna and Vronsky in some of the most explicit prose ever pub-
lished by Modernized Library. 
Heidi by Terry Southern and Mason Hoffenberg. A scathingly 
existentialist satire on the morality of Swiss peasantry living at the 
foot of Europe's most fashionable ski runs. Nothing like it since 
Vladimir Nabokov's "Little Women." Banned in Paris. 
Huckleberry Finn by James Baldwin. This long awaited indict-
ment of the white liberal is at once a tender and infuriated cry from 
the heart. Jim, its protagonist, is ostensibly aided by the typical well-
meaning but shallow white liberal, Huck, in his flight from the sinister 
Miss Watson. As the two drift down the Mississippi, the pent-up 
hatred on their raft gradually builds up to the breaking point, a 
moment of fury in which Jim makes Huck understand that he is 
bigoted because he, like Miss Watson, is incapable of love. In de-
spair, Jim leaps up to his death from the raft. Huck sails on to what 
will clearly be the sterile lifetime of a hack writer sending small sums 
anonymously to Jim's sister as conscience balm. 
The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes by William S. Burroughs. 
Holmes, a cocaine addict, is seen on the opening page snatching a 
bowler in the Charing Cross underground station to get pawnshop 
money for his pusher. We then follow him, more or less, on a 
bizarre romp through London, always one step ahead of Scotland 
Yard. Holmes's cocaine hallucinations---of everything from murder-
ous hounds to nude hanging scenes involving his junkie pal, Dr. 
Watson--constitute the most pungent statement ever composed 
against law enforcement. 
Wuthering Heights by Tennessee Williams. Heathcliff, a brood-
ing delicate lad who has been psychically mutilated by his domineer-
ing mother, is marked for marriage by the lusty, possessive Cathy, 
and the stage is set for tragedy. Williams provides it when Heath-
cliff falls into a pen of half-starved hogs. The critics will argue for 
years whether Heathcliff's fall was an act of will. 
Modernized Library would probably put an end to advertisements 
like the one that appeared recently in a local paper. "World's Great-
est Books!" it said. "Money-back guarantee."73 
73. Baker, Observer: Adapting Literature for the Culture Hungry, N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 10, 1965, § 4, at 12, col. 4. 
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One very much doubts that the lawyers for the Times, if in fact 
they were even consulted, experienced much difficulty in approving 
Mr. Baker's article for publication. Yet, if Triggs and the New York 
lower court cases following Triggs were good law, these lawyers cer-
tainly should have been concerned about the article. What is amaz-
ing is that in 1974 the American Law Institute approved changes 
in the Restatement of Torts, the effect of which would have been to 
broaden the scope of an action for defamation on the basis of cases 
that no serious observer could possibly think accurately reflected the 
current law. 
Nor was it only with respect to ridicule that the Institute adopted 
the attitude that a case that had not been expressly overruled was 
good law and therefore to be included in the game of counting noses. 
In Tentative Draft No. 20, dated April 25, 1974, the Institute cited 
only four cases in support of retaining the provision in section 566 
of the original Restatement that a "defamatory communication may 
consist of a statement of opinion based upon facts known or assumed 
by both parties to the communication."74 Of the four, one was an 
English case concerned with whether proof of actual malice toward 
the author of a book being reviewed in Punch could defeat the de-
fense of fair comment. 711 The· case also included some proof of a 
misstatement of facts. 76 The only relevance of the case to the point 
for which it was cited in Tentative Draft No. -20 was that the defen-
dant had apparently pleaded both truth and fair comment in defense 
to an action for defamation. Presumably, if actual malice could de-
feat the defense of fair comment, the draftsmen may have reasoned 
that actual malice could also make an unfavorable expression of 
opinion on known facts defamatory. The tentative draft does not 
discuss this aspect of the case, however, and also fails to discuss the 
position espoused in section 566 that such opinions could be action-
able regardless of the existence of actual malice. 
74. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566, at 42 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
One reason for the paucity of authority is undoubtedly that, where an attempt has 
been made to hold a person liable for the mere expression of an opinion without re• 
gard to whether there was some false implication of facts, the cases were usually liti-
gated under the claim that they were abuses of the common law privilege of fair com-
ment. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Pittsburgh Courier Publishing Co., 243 F.2d 705 (7th 
Cir. 1957); Catalfo v. Shenton, 102 N.H. 47, 149 A.2d 871 (1959); Hoeppner v. 
Dunkirk Printing Co., 254 N.Y. 95, 172 N.E. 139 (1930). Fair comment at common 
law was supposedly limited to subjects of "public interest," but the scope of what was 
considered "public interest" was broad and flexible, See Boyer, Fair Comment, 15 
Omo Sr. L.J. 280, 283-85 (1954). 
75. Thomas v. Bradbury, Agnew & Co., [1906] 2 K.B. 627 (C.A.), 
76. See 2 K.B. at 643. 
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The three American cases cited to support section 566 give 
scarcely this much- support for the proposition that an opinion based 
upon fully disclosed facts that does not imply the existence of other 
undisclosed facts can be defamatory.77 None of them required a rul-
ing on that precise question, and the most that can be culled from 
the dicta is that Restatement section 566 was cited in one of the 
cases in support of the proposition that " 'to assert a suspicion, belief, 
or opinion is as effectively a libel as though the charge were posi-
tively made.' "78 Yet it was on the basis of this relatively scant, 
largely unhelpful, and, in the case of the proposed section 567 A on 
ridicule, wholly obsolete authority that the Institute attempted to 
hold and even push back the line in the post-New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan world. 
Though Gertz79 ultimately put an end to the matter, even after 
that decision the Institute appeared to feel itself constrained by its 
77. Smith v. Levitt, 227 F.2d 855 (9th Cir. 1955); Professional & Business Men's 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 274 (D. Mont. 1958); Woolston v. 
Montana Free Press, 90 Mont. 299, 2 P.2d 1020 (1931). In the Smith case, Levitt, 
the plaintiff, had asserted in a telegram that he had in his possession what he believed 
to be irrefutable evidence that Senator Joseph McCarthy was a member of a sub-
versive organization. The defendants in their newspaper asserted that Levitt's state-
ment was "a lie" and that it was "a ruthless dagger dripping 'the blood' of character 
assassination." 227 F.2d at 857. The court held that Levitt's statement was open 
to reprisal and that Smith'.s rejoinder was privileged fair comment. It further held 
that, since Smith called Levitt a liar, it was open to Smith to challenge the bona fides 
of Levitt's asserted belief about McCarthy.- Again, this was not a case holding that 
mere opinion could be libelous. The court concluded that, "[i]f the attack be not 
malicious, the truth of the publication need not be established in order to make good 
the defense of conditional privilege. Whether the law of California or the common 
law be applied, the rulings [below in favor of Levitt] require reversal." 227 F.2d 
at 858. A number of Restatement provisions, including § 566, were cited in support 
of the last statement. In the Woolston case, in holding the alleged libel not to be 
libelous per se, the court said "to assert a suspicion, belief, or opinion is as effectively 
a libel as though the charge were positively made." 90 Mont. at 310, 2 P.2d at 1022. 
It is rather clear that the court was concerned with statements of fact that a publisher 
had attempted to disguise as mere statements of opinion. 
78. Professional & Business Men's Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Life Co., 163 F. Supp. 
274, 287 (D. Mont. 1958) (quoting Woolston, 90 Mont. at 310, 2 P.2d at 1022, dis-
cussed in note 77 supra). In its original form in Woolston, the statement undoubt-
edly referred to a situation where a libelous imputation of fact was made in the guise 
of an opinion. This also seems to be the context in which these words were used in 
Bankers Life, which involved several counts of libel appended to an antitrust claim. 
The plaintiff corporation asserted that the defendant corporation was trying to drive 
it out of business. The only cause of action for libel not dismissed by the court was 
based on a newspaper advertisement that advised persons to report to the state insur-
ance commissioner the receipt of certain representations from insurance agents. The 
advertisement was held to be libelous per se because it was tantamount to saying 
"call a cop" if a certain businessman attempts to do business with you, which al-
legedly harmed the plaintiff in its occupation or business. 163 F. Supp. at 286-89. 
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), discussed in text at notes 
12-13 supra. 
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past efforts. Rather than immediately abandoning the original 
Restatement's insistence that defamation could arise from an opinion 
based on known facts-a position that even if constitutionally possible 
in 1938 was logically inconsistent with the Restatement's own ap-
proach to defamation-it first proposed a solution that seemingly 
preserved a portion of its original stance. The initially proposed 
black letter law retained the possibility that an opinion qua opinion 
could support an action for defamation, even as the commentary 
written by the reporter acknowledged that this position disregarded 
the logic of Gertz.8° Fortunately, common sense ultimately prevailed, 
and the final version of section 566 conforms both with Gertz and 
with the internal logic of the Restatement. 81 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this Article has been to explain this curious 
solution to the problem of whether opinions can be defamatory, to 
show the internal inconsistencies in the Institute's approach to the 
matter from the very beginning of its efforts on the Restatement of 
Torts in the 1930s, and to point out the Institute's often wooden 
and pedantic approach to the case law. For the future this last item 
is the most important. There is a beauty in the case Jaw, but to 
use cases properly one must, as Llewellyn pointed out, try to find 
their "situation-sense."82 Without such guidance the cases can be-
come a quagmire in which lawyers struggle like beginning law 
students. Under these conditions the cases become meaningless or 
even harmful, since their presence can lead one to abandon common 
sense. 
As obvious as this last point may be, it needs to be stressed, for 
the inflexible approach taken by the Institute to the problem of de-
famatory opinion is not an isolated example. Another instance of 
rigidity in the Restatement (Second)'s treatment of defamation arose 
in connection with section 591, which deals with the privilege of exec-
utive or administrative officers to publish defamatory matter. The 
black letter law asserts that "any executive or administrative officer 
of the United States [or] governor or other superior executive of-
ficer of a state" has an absolute privilege if the publication is made 
in the performance of his official duties. 83 The comments to this 
80. See text at notes 37-38 supra. For a discussion of the Council's involvement 
in the issue, see note 37 supra. 
81. See text at notes 39-40 supra. 
82. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CoMMON LAW TRADITION 121-57 (1960). 
83. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS§ 591, at 181 (Tent. Draft No. 20, 1974). 
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section assert that several states have followed federal law and ex-
tended the absolute privilege to all employees however minor but 
that "the greater number of state courts have refused to make this 
extension."84 However, all but two of the cases cited in the re-
porter's notes85 as support for this statement in the comments ante-
dated Barr v. Matteo, 86 which the Restatement (Second) itself recog-
nizes as having extended the absolute privilege to lower federal offi-
cials. In fact, most of the cases cited in support of the statement in 
question were decided before 1920.87 On the other hand, the five 
cases cited in which state courts extended the absolute privilege to 
lower level employees were all decided after 1950.88 On the basis of 
this evidence, how the Restatement (Second) can assert "the greater 
number of state courts have refused to make this extension"-i.e., 
presumably, of the privilege extended in 1959 to all federal officials by 
Barr-is rather puzzling, particularly when this same comment confi-
dently asserts that this leaves the inferior state officers in these states 
with only a conditional privilege. 89 I do not claim to know what the 
relevant law is in these states, but I would suggest that it would be un-
wise for a practicing lawyer to accept unhesitatingly the Restatement 
(Second.J's assertion, particularly if the relevant cases in his jurisdic-
tion were decided before 1920.90 
84. Id.§ 591, Comment cat 182. 
85. Id. § 591, at 184-85. The two post-Barr cases that support the Restatement 
are Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 177 A.2d 841 (1962), and Ranous v. Hughes, 
30 Wis. 2d 452, 141 N.W.2d 251 (1966). Mayo v. Sample, 18 Iowa 306 (1865), 
was incorrectly cited by the Restatement as being decided in 1965. 
86. 360 U.S. 564 (1959). 
87. Barry v. McCollom, 81 Conn. 293, 70 A. 1035 (1908); Pearce v. Brower, 
72 Ga. 243 (1884); Mayo v. Sample, 18 Iowa 306 (1865); Tanner v. Stevenson, 138 
Ky. 518, 128 S.W. 878 (1910); Weber v. Lane, 99 Mo. App. 69, 71 S.W. 1099 
(1903); Collins v. Oklahoma State Hosp., 76 Okla. 229, 184 P. 946 (1916); In re 
Investigating Commn., 16 R.I. 751, 11 A. 429 (1887). 
88. Long v. Mertz, 2 Ariz. App. 215, 407 P.2d 404 (1965); McNay v. Kelly, 184 
So. 2d 428 (Fla. 1966); Schlinkat v. Henderson, 331 Mich. 284, 49 N.W.2d 180 
(1951); Sheridan v. Grisona, 14 N.Y.2d 108, 198 N.E.2d 359, 249 N.Y.S.2d 161 
(1964); Montgomery v. City of Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958). 
89. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 591, Comment c at 182 (Tent. Draft No. 
20, 1974). 
90. See Evans, New Freedom of Speech in Politics, 10 N.Y.L.F. 333 (1964), an 
instance of a practicing lawyer's ~arly awareness of the problem noted in the text. 
